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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
FIREMAN'S INSURANCE CO., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANN LARSEN BROWN, Z I O N S 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK, N.A., a 
corporation, and RUSSELL G. FULL-
MER, 
Defendants, 
RUSSELL G. FULLMER, 
Cross-Complainant-Respondent, 
vs. 
ANN LARSEN BROWN, 
Cross-Defendant-Appellant. J 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
13670 
NATURE OF CASE 
The instant proceedings were brought by Russell G. 
Fullmer, cross-complainant, hereinafter called "buyer" 
to fix the amount he was required to pay to perform his 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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real estate contract and to compel Ann Larsen Brown, 
cross-defendant and appellant, hereinafter called "seller" 
to convey title upon payment of the amount determined 
to be due her since there was a dispute between the par-
ties as to the amount due. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties entered into a uniform real estate contract 
on April 1, 1971, concerning property at 724 Lake Street 
in Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 84). 
On September 21, 1971, the home on the premises 
was destroyed by fire and the parties had a dispute as 
to how the proceeds of the insurance on the home and 
its contents should be distributed so the Fireman's In-
surance Company interpleaded the parties and the dis-
pute between the parties was tried and the Court de-
termined that the $9,299.45 paid into Court by the in-
surance carrier should be distributed as follows: $8,000.00 
as a credit on the aforesaid real estate contract, $1,099.45 
to seller, and $200.00 to buyer (the first sum being for 
insurance on the house and the latter two for coverage 
of its contents) (R. 32, 33). 
The Court in the above proceeding determined that 
the balance due under the contract was $3,040.26 after 
application of the aforesaid $8,000.00 with the payment 
being then made on March 1, 1972 (R. 33, 34). 
The contract required the buyer to pay $100.00 per 
month on the 1st day of each month. The defendant 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
failed and neglected to make the following payments due 
under the contract: 
April 1, 1972 $100.00 
May 1, 1972 100.00 
June 1, 1972 100.00 
July 1, 1972 100.00 
August 1, 1972 100.00 
September 1, 1972 100.00 
October 1, 1972 100.00 
November 1, 1972 100.00 
December 1, 1972 100.00 
January 1, 1973 100.00 
February 1, 1973 100.00 
March 1, 1973 100.00 
Thereupon the seller caused her attorney to serve a 
"Notice to Quit" upon the buyer for his breaches of this 
contract (Exhibit 2D). Service was made by the Salt 
Lake County Sheriff on March 26, 1973. On March 28, 
1973, the buyer's attorney wrote to seller's attorney say-
ing that the service was invalid but if it were valid, he 
assumed that buyer would contend as follows: 
1. That the contract is not delinquent and, in 
fact, is paid in advance. 
2. That forfeiture of the contract would be un-
conscionable and thus not available as a 
remedy in this case. 
3. That in the event of forfeiture being elected, 
the seller would be obligated to pay back the 
buyer's equity in the property in accordance 
with the principles set forth in Perkins v. 
Spencer and subsequent case authority (Ex. 
1-D). 
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After further correspondence, buyer's attorney wrote 
on April 12, 1973, saying, inter alia: 
"Mr. Fullmer still takes the same position as stated 
in my letter of March 28, 1973" (Exhibit 1-D, second 
letter). 
On May 11, 1973, seller's attorney wrote to her to 
advise her that it would be to her advantage to allow the 
$8,000.00 paid for March, 1972, to be applied to future 
payments as the buyer's attorney was contending had 
been done (Exhibit 7-D) and she acted in accordance 
with that advice (R. 119). 
The buyer did not make the payments due for the 
months of April, May, June, July, August, September, 
October, and November of 1973 (R. 117). On December 
1, 1973, the buyer paid $1,000.00. 
The buyer contended that the balance due under 
the contract was $2,040.26 plus interest. The seller con-
tended that the balance was $3,564.65 (R. 19, 20). Both 
sidles claimed attorney's fees of $300.00 for services re-
quired by breach of the other. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
The trial court found that the principal balance due 
on the contract after the $1,000.00 payment on December 
1, 1973, was $2,040.26 and that upon payment of that 
sum, together with interest of $399.00 to December 31, 
1973, the seller was ordered to convey title to the subject 
property. No attorney's fees were awarded to either 
party. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Seller seeks to have the Decree of the court below 
modified by having the principal balance determined to 
be $3,564.65, the sum which would be due if the $8,000.00 
paid in March, 1972, was actually applied to prepay-
ments and by allowing seller $300.00 for attorney's fees 
in the trial court and a reasonable sum for her fees on 
appeal and for the costs of court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
TO FIND THAT BUYER HAD ELECTED 
(BY HIS CONDUCT AND BY HIS ATTOR-
NEY'S DECLARING ON HIS BEHALF) 
THAT THE $8,000.00 FIRE INSURANCE 
PROCEEDS BE APPLIED TO FUTURE 
PAYMENTS RATHER THAN ON THE 
PRINCIPAL BALANCE AS OF MARCH 1, 
1972, AND THUS DETERMINED THE 
PRINCIPAL BALANCE TO BE FAR LESS 
THAN THE CORRECT AMOUNT. 
In order for the buyer to avoid the obligation of 
making monthly payments after a large payment than 
the contract called for, he could elect to have the pay-
ment applied to future payments. The subject contract 
provides that: 
"The buyer, at his option at any time, may 
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pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments 
upon the unpaid balance subject to the limita-
tions of any mortgage or contract by the buyer 
herein assumed, such excess to be applied either 
to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future 
installments at the election of the buyer, which 
election must be made at the time the excess 
payment is made" (Exhibit 1-P, Par. 4). 
Quite understandably his attorney then asserted that 
the $8,000.00 payment on March 1, 1972 should be ap-
plied to future payments (Exhibit 1-D) thus precluding 
any sanctions being invoked against him. At the trial 
his attorney contended he lacked actual authority from 
his client to make such an election or reapplication of 
the balloon payment but such action was the only course 
which was consistent with buyer's conduct for twelve 
months prior and seven months thereafter. 
Seller contended below and contends here that the 
parties mutually amended their contract by virtue of 
their actions or impliedly through their respective coun-
sel's actions. This amendment removed the restriction 
that would prohibit buyer from retroactively applying 
the $8,000.00 ballon payment to future payments. Buy-
er's non-payment of the monthly payments in the March 
1972 to December 1973 period plus seller's acquiescence 
therein had this effect, particularly in light of buyer's 
attorney's response to seller's attorney's attempts to re-
dress the breaches of contract prior to March 23, 1972 
and most especially in light of seller's attorney's letter 
of April 12, 1972, in which he stated inter alia: "the 
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$8,000.00 paid on March 1, 1972 applied to future pay-
ments" (Exhibit 1-P, second letter). 
The Trial Court took the position that the matter 
at issue was res judicata inasmuch as the Court in the 
main action had applied the payment in question to the 
principal balance and seller had not taken an appeal 
from that decision (R. 11). 
Seller does not question the correctness of the Court's 
position as of December 30, 1972, when the appeal time 
ran but nothing the Court ruled on in November, 1972, 
could preclude the parties from thereafter amending their 
contract so that payments made at a prior time would 
be applied in a certain manner. (17 Am. Jur. 2d 924, 
Contracts Sec. 458, et seq. and 46 Am. Jur. 2d 589, Judg-
ments, Sec. 420.) 
The same results can be predicated on the well-rec-
ognized principle of estoppel. Here seller asserted twelve 
breaches of contract (actually seventeen were asserted but 
in view of the Court's application of the $8,000.00 which 
was subsequent to the first five monthly payments due, 
the smaller number only is here applicable). Buyer de-
nied through his attorney expressly and by his conduct 
before and afterwards that he was not in default. Seller 
acted in reliance upon his representation (that the 
$8,000.00 was applied, at least so far as he was concerned, 
or reapplied, regardless of the Court's decision in Novem-
ber, 1972, to future payments) to her detriment (by not 
pursuing the remedy she sought to invoke in March, 
1973) and thus buyer is now estopped to deny that the 
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$8,000.00 was applied to future payments. (28 Am. Jur. 
2d 640, Estoppel and Waiver, Sec. 35.) 
If the $8,000.00 payment in March, 1972, was not 
applied as prepayments of future installments, can there 
be any doubt that in March, 1973, the buyer was in 
breach of his contract (in fact had committed 12 breaches 
of contract for that many monthly payments in the prior 
year) when seller served him with notice that he was 
and a demand that he remedy those breaches within six 
days (Exhibit 2-D)? If that is so, how can it be justice 
to allow buyer to evade the consequences of those breaches 
and the eight subsequent breaches of monthly payments 
during the period April, 1973, through December, 1973? 
If the buyer was not in breach of his contract in 
March, 1973 (as his attorney then contended on his be-
half and which he confirmed by his not paying the 
monthly payments otherwise due thereafter) or at the 
time of the trial of this cause as buyer asserted at trial, 
then how can the $8,000.00 be applied to future payments 
other than in the manner computed on Exhibit 6-D? (It 
should be noted that buyer's attorney admitted that he 
didn't understand those computations but did not demon-
strate the error thereof or explain to the court the manner 
of application he contended would be correct if the sum in 
question was applied to future installments. - See R. 123). 
Appellant urges respondent's counsel in his brief to set 
forth the mathematics he contends is correct if the 
$8,000.00 was applied to future installments in the April, 
1972 — November, 1973, period. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Decree below should be modified to require the 
respondent to pay appellant the principal sum of $3,564.65 
plus interest and $300.00 attorney's fees for services in 
the trial court necessitated by respondent's breach of 
contract plus an additional reasonable fee for services 
on appeal plus costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney for 
CrosS'Defendant-Appellant 
838 - 18th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
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